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Crisis States Programme 
 
Governance and Conflict Management: 
Implications for donor intervention 
 
 
Introduction 
Conflict, a state of opposition between ideas or interests, is unavoidable. Indeed, conflict is 
can be a desirable generator of positive change and improvement. However, when conflict is 
expressed through violence, it can lead to massive civilian casualties, displacement, economic 
hardship and state collapse – with the poor invariably being hit hardest. The premise of this 
paper is that it is possible to manage difference and divergence constructively and without 
resort to violence.  
 
It is axiomatic to say that where there is good governance, there is a greater likelihood that 
conflict will be managed peaceably. The paper explores the impact of a number of key 
governance capabilities1 on the effectiveness with which intra-societal conflict is managed. 
Although the opportunities for intervention will differ according to whether a state is in-
conflict, pre-, or post-conflict, similar principles of conflict management are applicable. 
 
Transitions from war to peace…are more usefully seen as involving a realignment of political 
interests and a readjustment of economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to 
consent, from theft to production, or from repression to democracy2. 
 
The causes of violent conflict are multifarious. The traditional view is that conflict is caused 
by grievance resulting from social, economic and political inequality between groups. 
Historical patterns of violence make it more likely that these grievances lead to violent 
conflict. Recent work has emphasised the need to understand economic motivations for 
conflict. War is not a chaotic process involving only costs. Individual benefits also accrue and 
economic agendas (or ‘greed’) can be as strong a motivating factor as ‘grievance’ in initiating 
and sustaining conflict3. This is particularly so in countries with valuable reserves of natural 
resources. Causes of conflict which are more macro-economic in nature have also been 
identified: there is a correlation between economic shocks or decline and increased conflict; 
whilst GDP per capita is systematically related to ethnic conflict4.  
 
These ‘primary’ causes can generate heightened group identity around ethnicity or religion – 
often at the instigation of political elites – and the resulting tensions can become causes of 
conflict in their own right.  
 
                                                 
1 As outlined in DFID, Making Government Work for Poor People: Building State Capacity, London, 2001a. 
2 M. Berdal, & D. M. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Ottawa: IDRC, 
2000, p. 9; quoting an earlier study. 
3 “[I]nternal forms of war are now better understood as the continuation of economics by other means”, (M. 
Duffield, ‘Globalisation and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History’, Fletcher Forum of 
World Affairs, special issue on ‘The Geography of Confidence’, Vol 23, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp.19-36 
 (drawing on David Keen’s work). 
4 Zeric K. Smith, ‘The Imp act of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on Ethnic Conflict in Africa: An 
empirical test of common assumptions’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38, no. 1 (2000), pp.29-39. 
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This paper takes the view that the causes of conflict identified above are less likely to lead to 
violence where the governance structures of the state provide political redress and generate 
compromise, moderation and inclusion; that, at least to a certain degree, “politics is the 
prosecution of war by other means”5. It focuses on elements of constitutional design, political 
and justice systems, and various non-constitutional governance capabilities that play a role in 
the peaceful management of conflict. It also looks at the role that international governance 
plays in promoting and preventing violent conflict.  In conclusion, it draws out some 
implications for donor intervention in the governance field at national and international 
levels. 
 
This paper, which draws on readings, interviews with researchers and DFID experience, was 
written under the guidance of Jeremy Clarke, Deputy Chief Governance Adviser.  Its 
objective is to initiate a debate on governance and conflict management within the 
Governance Network. Comments are therefore welcome and should be sent to either j-
clarke@dfid.gov.uk or b- latto@dfid.gov.uk.  
 
 
Constitutional conflict management 
The design of a state’s political institutions is a key factor in the peaceful management of 
conflict. This has sometimes been ignored, particularly in a post-conflict context where the 
emphasis has been on reassembling pre-war institutions rather than rethinking them. Without 
suggesting that there is an institutional blueprint, this section tries to understand how a 
constitutional system can generate compromise, moderation and inclusion. Opportunities for 
radical constitutional rethinking are rare and when they do occur, room for manoeuvre is 
constrained by political considerations. Furthermore, the extent to which external parties 
should attempt to influence institutional design is debatable. These points are taken up in the 
final section. 
 
Democracy or not? 
There are grounds for arguing that liberal democracy is not the best form of government for 
managing conflict. The non-negotiable nature of the issues dividing a society – such as 
religion and ethnicity – can become politicised by democracy and thereby reinforced. 
Democracy provides space for strongly opposed groups to generate conflict that risks 
destabilising the state. In Fiji and Sri Lanka, for example, multi-party democracy exposed and 
hardened divisions and led to conflict even where democratic institutions were carefully 
designed6. 
 
However, the majority of writers agree that democratic systems have, on the whole, proved 
more successful than oligarchy or authoritarianism at managing (rather than suppressing) 
conflict7. Democratic societies tend to develop the institutions, resources and flexibility, in 
                                                 
5 G. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987. For an alternative view 
that violence is not caused by frustrations with the political system, but rather “micro-mechanisms” such as 
personal safety, see Lemann, N., ‘What Terrorists Want’, The New Yorker, 29 October 2001, pp.36-41 (quoting 
David Laitin). 
6 See F. Stewart & M. O’Sullivan, ‘Democracy, Conflict and Development – Three Cases’, QEH Working 
Paper Series 15, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 1998. 
7 See, for example, R. Luckham, A.M. Goetz & M. Kaldor, Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts of 
Inequality, Poverty and Conflict: A Conceptual Framework , Institute of Development Studies, Sussex 
University, Working Paper 104, 2000; A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; P. Harris & B. 
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the long term, to manage conflict peacefully. This view partly accounts for the increasing 
emphasis that has been placed on democratic governance by international and bi- lateral 
donors. But, most proponents of democracy as an effective system for conflict management 
emphasise that formal democratic institutions alone are not enough and that to manage 
conflict a state must have genuine legitimacy based on democratic politics. This is taken up in 
section 3.  
 
State structure 
1. Power-sharing: a consociational versus an integrative approach 
The introduction of power-sharing political systems can prevent identity-based conflicts from 
turning or returning into violence. Power-sharing systems, in contrast to majoritarian systems 
(discussed further in section 2.4), place an emphasis on decision making through a consensus 
of the different groups and can help produce a stable government with broad support.  
 
There are two approaches to power-sharing. Consociationalism accepts that there is a need 
for group or ethnic building blocks. The common features of the consociational approach are: 
a central executive in the form of a ‘grand coalition’ made up of representatives of all major 
groups; proportional electoral representation and proportional allocation of public funds and 
employment; devolution of considerable power to ethnic groups; and constitutional vetoes for 
minorities. The Dayton Accord for Bosnia is a good example.  
 
The alternative to consociationalism is an integrative approach to power-sharing. This seeks 
to foster cross-ethnic political coalitions and to create incentives for political leaders to be 
moderate on divisive ethnic themes. Elements of this approach include electoral systems that 
encourage “vote pooling” (pre-election pacts across ethnic lines) and non-ethnic federalism8. 
In an integrative approach, initial power-sharing arrangements are not enshrined in the 
constitution, but are rather designed to be self-terminating. South Africa’s post-apartheid 
interim constitution is a good example. The power-sharing Government of National Unity 
was dissolved once a new constitution had been produced. 
 
The consociational form of power-sharing is an attractive solution where the alternative 
would be the break-up of a multi-ethnic country. For it to work, there needs to be a 
sufficiently strong core of moderates at the political centre that seek pragmatic coexistence in 
a multi-ethnic society. This core of elites needs to be able to guarantee to each other that they 
are fully supported by their communities. South Africa, Malaysia and possibly Bosnia would 
seem to have such a core; Rwanda does not. This would suggest that it is not suitable for 
deeply divided societies. Indeed, in Rwanda, an incipient power-sharing pact was scuttled by 
the 1994 genocide.  
 
Even where consociationalism does provide a solution, it should be seen as a temporary one, 
to “keep the lid on the pressure cooker of a divided society that is about to blow”9. It runs the 
risk of defining all politics in divisive, ethnic terms. Consociationalism should have built into 
it a strategy for moving towards a more integrative or, eventually, majoritarian form of 
democracy in which minority inclusion is guaranteed, not through quotas, but through 
                                                                                                                                                        
Reilly, ‘Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators’, IDEA Handbook Series, Stockholm, 
1998. 
8 See D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 
9 B. Reilly & A. Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies, Committee on International 
Conflict Resolution, Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999. 
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universal human rights and constitutional checks and balances.10 This difficult transition 
should prove easier where the deliberate nurturing of public support for peace has preceded 
the consociational agreement, as it did in Northern Ireland. 
 
2. Devolution: autonomy, federalism and decentralisation 
Many conflicts are over control of the state and the resulting control of economic power. One 
approach to managing this conflict is to re-structure the state through devolution of power via 
federalism, autonomy or decentralisation. A good example of this is the post-Franco 
constitution in Spain which succeeded in reducing violent demands for secession by 
establishing “autonomous communities”. This is a complex area with many different possible 
models. This paper simply identifies some generic principles about devolution and conflict 
management. 
 
Some advantages of devolution are: 
Where minorities stand little chance of influence through parliamentary representation, it 
gives them a measure of state power and can help them preserve their culture. 
It may allow for a compromise that avoids secession. 
Plural arenas can increase the overall level of political competition; this in turn can inc rease 
differences within ethnic groups and lead to their fragmentation. Similarly positioned splinter 
groups from different ethnicities can then form cross-ethnic coalitions. 
Escalation of crises to the national level can be avoided where a devolved entity can deal with 
the problem itself. 
The very negotiations to devolve power can contribute to the legitimacy of the state. 
Even if not sustainable, devolution can provide a breathing space in hostilities. 
 
Some possible risks of devolution are: 
If configured in ethnic terms, it can, as in Bosnia, reinforce cleavages created by political 
violence and ethnic cleansing. 
Weak decentralised entities may be ill-equipped to manage conflict11. 
It can exacerbate tensions between richer and poorer regions. 
Destabilisation may result from national majority leaders losing electoral support or the 
‘losers’ in the new power balance resorting to violence. 
The devolution can provide regions with the necessary institutions on which to base 
secession, as happened in the former Yugoslavia. 
Other minorities – including newly created minorities within devolved entities – might 
mobilise to demand further devolution. 
 
In the reverse of the devolution process, but often linked to it, there is also the possibility of 
managing national conflict through the transfer of power upwards to broader regional 
organisations. The European Union provides a good example of competences that were 
traditionally seen as issues of national sovereignty being transferred upwards in return for 
shared decision-making. This has a particular effect on the relationship between a national 
state and its regions. States feel less threatened by independence-minded regions; regions, in 
                                                 
10 For more detail see G. McAllister, Power-Sharing and Post-Conflict Transition: A Comparative Study, paper 
prepared for DFID, May 2001; and Harris and Reilly (1998). 
11 As in Cambodia: D. Hendrickson Hendrickson, D., ‘Globalisation, Insecurity and Post-war Reconstruction: 
Cambodia’s Precarious Transition’, in Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and 
Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 2001). 
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their turn, become more willing to accept a diluted national sovereignty. However, a high 
level of development may be a pre-condition for this type of arrangement to be successful. 
 
Parliamentary versus presidential systems 
The power balance between a country’s legislature and executive is an important factor in the 
management of conflict.  Huge variations exist in the systems used to balance this power and 
it is rare to find ‘pure’ versions of either parliamentary or presidential systems. This section, 
therefore, rather than trying to compare these two systems directly, aims to draw out key 
characteristics that can affect the management of conflict. 
 
Parliamentary systems 
Parliamentary systems can facilitate the inclusion of minorities within the executive as 
cabinets are often drawn from the legislature. 
In most parliamentary systems, the executive requires at least the confidence of the 
legislature which provides a check on executive abuse of power. 
Parliamentary coalitions can change without recourse to a possibly destabilising election. 
But: 
The inclusivity of a cabinet can be reduced through the discipline of majority parties. 
Collective cabinet decision-making can lead to a lack of accountability and possible 
deadlocks. 
Parliamentary systems are not immune to majority tyranny – if one dominant group forms the 
absolute majority of a population, a parliamentary system risks being dominated by it. 
 
Presidential systems 
A president is highly identifiable and therefore has the potential to be highly accountable.  
A president can offer the national appeal that parliamentarians drawn from particular 
localities and groups often cannot. 
A president can be an important figure of national unity (Nelson Mandela, for example).  
But :  
If a state has few equally sized groups, there is a danger that a presidential system is seen as 
‘captured’ by the one group that inevitably must win the office of President. 
 
Whichever executive type, the electoral system influences the extent to which compromise, 
moderation and inclusion is achieved. A parliamentary system needs some form of 
proportional representation if minorities are to be represented in parliament and form part of 
coalition governments. Likewise, it may be crucial in a presidential system for the 
presidential elections to encourage candidates to have a moderate platform by requiring some 
geographic distribution of the vote or by taking into account second or third choice votes (see 
section 2.4).  
 
Further work needs to examine the potential that hybrid systems have to combine the 
advantages of parliamentary and presidential systems. It is worth noting, from a conflict 
management point of view, that complicated divisions of power can contribute to a lack of 
accountability and reduce state legitimacy. 
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Choice of electoral system 
Different electoral systems, in the way they interact with the numbers and geographical 
dispersal of different groups, can provide different outcomes for divided societies. Of 
particular relevance to the management of conflict is the way in which the choice of electoral 
system influences whether co-operative or exclusionary behaviour is rewarded with political 
power. 
 
There is a fairly strong consensus among academics that majoritarian systems, whilst good at 
assuring effective government in consolidated democracies, are rarely suitable for divided 
societies12. Systems such as the block vote and the two-round system have been widely 
experimented with in fledgling democracies and have tended to lead to single party 
domination of parliaments, the elimination of opposition and, eventually, to authoritarian 
regimes. The majoritarian system in Sri Lanka for example marginalized political and ethic 
minorities, leading one commentator to conclude that institutional designs drawn from the 
West have “very little to contribute with regard to the problem of underdevelopment, poverty 
and class”13. 
 
Four systems have been identified which have potential in divided societies. The major 
characteristics of these systems are: 
 
List proportional representation (PR) – inclusive legislature with all significant groups 
represented; often part of package of consociationalism (see section 2.2.1) 
Alternative vote (AV) – in order to attain majority thresholds in ethnically-mixed districts, 
parties need to cultivate the second preference votes from groups other than their own, 
encouraging gravitation to a moderate, multi-ethnic centre 
Single Transferable vote (STV) – a quota of votes is established which a candidate must 
achieve to be elected; results are proportional, leading to power-sharing, but parties are also 
encouraged to seek votes from other groups via secondary preferences 
Communal rolls or reserved seats – the ratio of ethnic groups is fixed in advance, so electors 
make their choice using non-ethnic criteria. 
 
The following factors influence which system might best manage conflict in a particular 
society. 
 
Nature of group identity 
The more rigid conflictual identities are, the more important it is that institutions represent 
“groups” in close approximation to their size. Large district PR systems can provide this, as 
in Bosnia and South Africa. Where identities become more fluid, room develops for electoral 
systems that encourage multiethnic voting coalitions through preference voting, e.g. AV in 
Fiji in 1997. 
 
Intensity of conflict 
In practice, where conflict has been more intense and violent, list PR systems have often been 
employed, as in Bosnia and South Africa, while integrative systems like AV have been used 
in societies with more moderate divisions. (The success of list PR at managing conflict in the 
                                                 
12 F. Stewart & V. FitzGerald (eds),  War and Underdevelopment, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
13 Coomaraswamy (2001; quoted in S. Bastian & R. Luckham, ‘The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-
Torn Societies – Conclusions’, draft prepared for Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict-Torn 
Societies Conference, Sarajevo, September 2001). 
  
8
relatively moderate societies of Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland can be explained 
by these countries’ high level of development.) 
 
Geographic distribution of groups 
AV systems work best where there are heterogeneous electoral districts, i.e. where there is a 
low number of geographically intermixed groups, or a high number of geographically 
separated groups. Where groups are geographically separated (often as a result of intense 
conflict), single-member electoral districts are likely to produce ethnic fiefdoms and therefore 
multi-member list PR systems might be more appropriate as results will remain proportional 
(e.g. Bosnia, Belgium).  
 
Number of groups 
List PR as part of a consociational package works best when there are only three or four 
groups14. Conversely, AV systems fail to produce vote-pooling where there is a limited 
number of groups. 
 
Relative size of groups 
List PR as part of consociationalism is more successful where there are groups of roughly 
equal size.  
 
State of democracy 
A state in transition or with democratic failure needs to promote the legitimacy of the 
electoral process with a system which allows minorities to be represented, which is simple 
and which minimises the risk of pre-election conflict over electoral boundaries. Such a state 
might be best served by large regional or national list proportional representation. By 
contrast, a state seeking democratic consolidation might achieve a stronger government with 
greater political and geographic accountability through small constituencies.  
 
Is the objective representation or influence of minority groups? 
List PR may be effective at ensuring minority representation. However, AV and STV are 
better at encouraging minority influence more broadly in the political process.  
 
Elite or electorate moderation 
Where elites are likely to be more moderate than the electorate, list PR enables the major 
parties to include candidates from various groups on their tickets. Where the electorate is 
seen as being a source of moderation, AV and STV systems should result in the election of 
more moderate leaders with more accommodative policies. STV systems might offer an 
intermediate solution as they encourage some vote-pooling while retaining proportionality. (It 
can be argued that the 1998 Northern Ireland STV system encouraged the pro-agreement, 
non-sectarian centre). Where neither the elite nor the electorate can be looked to for 
moderation, separate electoral rolls or reserved seats might provide a solution15. However 
these last options – referred to as explicitist approaches – artificially sustain ethnic divisions 
and should be avoided if possible.  
 
Reilly and Reynolds16 conclude that there is potential in creating a hybrid electoral system 
such as the 1997 Fijian constitution which mixed AV with consociational power-sharing and 
                                                 
14 A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1977. 
15 Reilly & Reynolds (1999). 
16 Reilly & Reynolds (1999). 
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some guaranteed communal representation. They also suggest that it is better to make 
moderate reforms of an existing system than to jump to a completely new and unfamiliar 
system. 
 
Fiji: the perils of trying to avert potentially violent conflict by constitutional engineering 
alone 
Post independence electoral arrangements in Fiji were identified as responsible for 
exacerbating ethnic rivalry. The new preferential voting system, it was hoped, would instead 
pave the way towards pre-election vote pooling alliances and robust coalitions between 
political parties representing Fijians and Indo-Fijians. The constitution’s electoral 
arrangements were based on a modified Alternative Vote (AV), designed to foster cross-
ethnic voting and political alliances among the more moderate parties, whose representation 
in the legislature would be enhanced.  
The new electoral system achieved none of the goals that electoral engineers expected. The 
1999 election produced a legislature which was not only insufficiently representative in 
relation to the different parties’ shares of the vote, but also gave more seats to hardliners, 
creating a political impasse which provided the pretext for the 2000 putsch by armed ethnic 
Fijian extremists. In contrast to the expectations of the international advisers to Fiji’s 
electoral reforms, the new system led to the defeat of the moderates. 
This would support the argument that ethnic fractions produce ethnically polarised politics 
and not the other way about. It questions the assumption that somehow electoral behaviour on 
the basis of ethnicity and ethnic identity can be made to disappear through the clever design 
of electoral systems. “There are no electoral-engineering-type solutions, involving neat 
institutional mechanisms for securing multi-ethnic parties or governments. The more modest 
goal is an electoral system that does not exacerbate divisions. The rest is politics.”17 
 
 
State legitimacy and conflict management 
There is a strong body of opinion that conflict management interventions have placed too 
much emphasis on institutional design and not enough on state legitimacy18. The key to 
legitimacy is that citizens are confident that the structures of the state are capable of 
managing their competing interests and will do so equitably. There are many factors which 
lead to state legitimacy; these stand out in the conflict context: the extent to which democratic 
practice has been internalised so that democracy is the “only game in town”; how 
representative, accountable and free from corruption it appears; and its ability to guarantee 
security and services to citizens. 
 
Competitive politics 
The kind of democratic institutions that were described in Section 2 can only flourish if they 
are supported by active and broadly-based competitive politics. Democratic institutions can 
create incentives for democratic politics. But the emphasis of interventions should be “as 
much on democratic politics as on institutions, as much on substantive democratisation as on 
                                                 
17 Source Bastian (2001)(drawing on J. Frankel, Draft paper on Fiji prepared for Strengthening Democratic 
Governance in Conflict-Torn Societies Conference, Sarajevo, September 2001). 
18 For example R. Luckham, I. Ahmed, R. Muggah, & S. White, Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: an 
Assessment of the Issues and Evidence, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, Working Paper 
128, 2000. For an opposing view, see L. Diamond, ‘Towards Democratic Consolidation’, in L. Diamond & M. 
F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996. 
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formal democratic rules, and even more on bottom-up integrative social processes than on 
institutional agreements artificially imposed from above”19. Africa, for instance, has many 
examples of formal compliance to a system of multi-party elections, but very rarely has this 
coincided with fundamental change in the patterns and goals of politics. Similarly, early 
elections in Bosnia, rather than building a unitary, self-governing, multi-ethnic state, have 
legitimised ethnically purged constituencies and led to a flawed international protectorate. 
Pugh and Cobble argue that it would have been better to concentrate on introducing notions 
of accountability and participation than rely on contrived electoral systems20.  
 
A different case study comparing Mostar and Tuzla shows that with essentially the same 
institutional design, the decentralized authority in the former failed to manage conflict, while 
in the latter a multi-ethnic coalition survived throughout the war21. The difference lay in the 
existence in Tuzla of a democratic political culture that could effectively exploit the conflict-
management potential of democratic institutions. Factors such as the structure and 
configuration of competitive party politics, the profile and strength of civil society and the 
strength of the local economy influenced the capacity of democratic decentralisation to 
manage conflicts effectively.  
 
Pluralist democracies have a variety of channels through which divergent forces can 
communicate. The institutions of civil society – the press, social and sporting clubs, residence 
associations, youth groups (e.g. in Kosovo), church groups, labour unions etc. – enable 
communication between individuals from different cultures and perspectives22. NGOs form 
with a view to influencing policy outcomes and community-based groups develop collective 
representation. All of these groups can provide a voice outside government that can enhance 
the accountability of government and therefore its legitimacy. The success of democratic 
conflict management in India can be partly explained by an active civil society and the 
myriad crosscutting of social, religious, regional, caste, and linguistic loyalties23. 
 
There is also, of course, what might be termed ‘uncivil’ society – organisations and networks 
whose interests are predominantly ethnic or nationalist. But even these can contribute to the 
peaceful management of conflict if the logic of political competition is structured in such a 
way as to be centripetal and coalitional rather than destructive and exclusionary24. 
 
Political parties can be responsible for heightening conflict when they enhance differences as 
a way of gaining political support, as has happened in Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia. 
This might suggest that a post-conflict state should not rush into multi-party democracy. 
President Museveni of Uganda, for example, has banned political parties for a (rather long) 
transition period as a conflict-management measure. However, it is clear that political parties 
based around programmes rather than personalities are essential if democratic politics are to 
develop over the long run. They provide a means for citizens to aggregate their political 
preferences and participate in government, serving as an intermediary between government 
                                                 
19 Luckham, et al. (2000). 
20 M. Pugh & M. Cobble, ‘Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: Implications for Democracy 
and Peace-Building’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, no. 1 (2001), pp27-47. 
21 Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, ‘Managing Ethnic Conflicts: Democratic Decentralisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 
paper prepared for Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict-Torn Societies Conference, Sarajevo, 
September 2001. 
22 Reilly & Reynolds (1999), p.4. 
23 Luckham, et al. (2000). 
24 R. Crook, Strengthening Democratic Governance In Conflict Torn Societies: Civic Organisations, 
Democratic Effectiveness And Political Conflict , Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2001. 
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and civil society. They have a particularly important role as critics of government action in 
opposition.  
 
There are a number of strategies which can develop the role that civil society plays in 
competitive politics in divided societies: 
Projects which have a focus on building the capacity of advocacy organisations which are 
more “embedded” than donor-driven service delivery NGOs. 
Projects to strengthen the independent media with a view to raising awareness of human and 
democratic rights, including coverage of often neglected rural areas25.  
Human rights bodies which can draw on strengthened international consensus on human 
rights.  
Promoting the internal democracy of NGOs and political parties. 
Projects which develop space for civil society within government processes – for example, 
institutionalised government consultation of civil society drawing on the experience of 
consultative processes like those used to generate poverty reduction strategies. 
Alliances between domestic civil society and the embryonic international civil society. 
Promoting political debate around issues like land reform and social services which provide 
the opportunity for new alliances to be formed across conflicting identities26 (see section on 
Justice and conflict below for the role that rights can play in this regard). 
 
Accountability 
The legitimacy of a state, and therefore its capacity to manage conflict, can be enhanced by 
increasing its accountability towards its citizens and the accountability of its citizens to the 
rule of law. This section identifies elements of this accountability that are particularly 
relevant to conflict-torn societies. 
 
1. Justice and conflict 
Sustaining legitimacy through the rule of law 
A reliable and accessible justice system plays a crucial role in conflict management. It allows 
disputes to be resolved without recourse to violence27. Furthermore, the protection of 
property rights and the enforcement of contracts provide legal security that fosters economic 
investment and growth. This growth, in turn, increases the opportunity costs of violence. 
Enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation and affirmative action measures can help to 
reduce inter-group inequalities over the longer term. 
 
Judicial independence and impartiality 
Montesquieu’s prescription of complete separation of powers proves difficult to implement in 
practice (the Lord Chancellor in the U.K. manages magnificently to be a member of the 
legislature, executive and judiciary). However, a vital element of state legitimacy is a 
judiciary that is independent of the executive and which has the power to constrain a 
                                                 
25 As in the pre-genocide democratisation process in Rwanda: P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: the Development 
Enterprise in Rwanda, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998, p.235. 
26 S. Unsworth, ‘Understanding Pro-Poor Change: a discussion paper’, presented at DFID Governance 
Department Annual Development Seminar, Kendal, October 2001. 
27 For a defence of the link between local grievance and larger scale violent conflict, DFID, Conflict Prevention 
in the Balkans: A Strategy in the Area of Access to Justice, Draft, 25 September, 2001b, para. 3.2.1. 
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president or ruling party from abusing or usurping power. Citizens should be able to seek 
redress through the courts for illegal or irrational decisions made by any part of the public 
administration. Furthermore, the accountability of state bureaucracies to the judiciary can 
help to protect them from being misused by majoritarian governments. 
 
Judicial appointments should be immune from political interference. Tenure should be 
sufficiently long to ensure that they are not subjected to pressure from the executive on 
seeking re-appointment. Judicial training, and legal training generally, helps to ensure judicial 
impartiality. 
 
Human rights protection 
Legal norms that protect human rights provide a substantive content to governance by 
introducing principles of fairness and social justice and placing a limit on the power of the 
majority. Human rights can help to emphasise communality and move divided societies away 
from an excessive focus on groups. They allay the fears of minority groups that they will be 
discriminated against or persecuted by the ruling majority.  
 
Rights can also play a role in fostering mobilisation on the basis of interests other than 
‘particularist identity’. Property rights, the right to universal education, and the right to 
representation with taxation might all help to nurture issues-based politics28. As discussed in 
the section above, an active and informed civil society is required to encourage this 
mobilisation. 
 
Policing 
National issues of safety and security are dealt with briefly in Section 3.4 below, but local 
issues of security are also important for conflict management. It can be argued that incidents 
of crime that are not justly dealt with can seed grievances which could eventually lead to 
violent conflict29. Police reform is therefore vital. Furthermore, there is often a role for a 
crime prevention strategy using local level police forces and community policing, particularly 
in cases, like the Balkans, where the official police are seen as tainted by their association 
with the state. 
 
2. The particular case of transitional justice 
Responding to the immediate consequences of violent conflict 
During a violent conflict, states often collapse and alternative systems of economics and 
governance develop. Once conflict has ended, the justice system needs to respond to the 
legacy of increased levels of violence, organised crime, trafficking and corruption. The 
justice system needs to protect the rights of those made more vulnerable by the conflict – the 
internally displaced, refugees, women – and deal with issues such as the illegal occupation of 
property. 
 
Dealing with human rights violations 
At the end of a violent conflict how should a new regime deal with the wrongs of the old 
order? The menu of responses runs from forgiveness to punishment; from amnesty through 
truth commissions and removal of civil rights to criminal prosecution. Often there is a tension 
between the desire to dispense justice and the need for political stability. This will be greater 
where the new regime is the product of a negotiated settlement with those pushing for change 
                                                 
28 Unsworth (2001). 
29 DFID (2001b), para. 3.2.7. 
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The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
The TRC was set up in 1995 with a two-year mandate, 17 members and Desmond Tutu 
as the Chair.  It gave the opportunity for people at any level and on all sides to declare 
their part in human rights abuses, express regret and seek amnesty.  Given the nature of 
the negotiated emergence of the post-Apartheid regime, its objective was reconciliation 
rather than revenge. 
(from either inside or outside the old regime) than where there has been collapse or 
revolution.  
 
The case for forgiveness 
The new order may not be able to risk a destabilising backlash from those who might be 
prosecuted and their supporters. 
The new regime may depend upon reconciliation which prosecution would preclude. 
Forgiveness allows valuable human resources in the public, private and military sectors to 
continue to work. 
Punishment may weaken the fragile rule of law by rushing justice, being seen to be political, 
and bending rules limiting liability in time and prohibiting legislation that retroactively 
criminalises an activity.  
Deciding and implementing a just punishment can be very expensive. 
 
The case for punishment 
Justice must be seen to be done in order to heal past wrongs and foster a new moral order. 
Two possible sources of destabilisation can be removed: through punishing criminals and 
giving justice to victims. 
If criminals go unpunished, the new regime and the rule of law may lose legitimacy. 
As a deterrent: pour encourager les autres. 
 
“…the least unsatisfactory course may well be: do not prosecute, do not punish, do not 
forgive, and, above all, do not forget.”30 
 
Truth Commissions 
Truth Commissions are temporary bodies whose mandate is to investigate and provide a 
public record of human rights abuses under the previous regime. They may apportion blame 
(without sanction), grant amnesties in return for confession, and recommend reforms. 
 
To function well they need independent members (possibly even foreigners), a broad 
mandate, sufficient investigative resources and powers, and a realistic timeframe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The strengths of Truth Commissions lie in promoting reform, raising the profile of human 
rights, buying time and legitimacy for a new regime, and providing evidence for tribunals that 
take longer to establish. 
 
Their limitations are that they may eventually disappoint citizens expecting justice, their 
impact is dependant on sustained political will to act on their find ings, they cannot deal with 
                                                 
30 Samuel P. Huntingdon, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
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human rights abuses in the present, and they can effectively be giving non-judicial guilty 
verdicts without respecting due process. 
 
War Crimes Tribunals 
War Crimes Tribunals can be set up to punish human rights violations which occur during a 
violent conflict. Unlike a Truth Commission, a War Crimes Tribunal has the power to 
prosecute and sentence those suspected of human rights violations. A tribunal’s aim is to 
build peace as an element of the reconciliation process and deter future violations. The focus 
on specific individuals rather than groups can help to diffuse ethnic tensions. 
 
There is an international consensus on individual responsibility for war crimes and the 
auspices of the UN can help neutralise claims that they dispense victors’ justice by 
establishing an international tribunal. One of the major challenges is keeping the support of 
governments whose help is needed to apprehend indicted individuals. International tribunals 
may also run the risk of weakening national governments by the implication that national 
institutions are not capable of dealing with national crimes. Furthermore, the time taken to set 
them up can limit their capacity to demonstrate the rule of law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice for participants  
National Truth Commissions and national or international courts have limited capacity to deal 
with situations where there are large numbers of people suspected of participating in human 
rights abuses. Non-judicial forms of justice can provide a solution. For example, by the end 
of 1997 Rwanda’s prison population was around 130,000 and the judicial system was no 
longer coping. The Gacaca system offered a non-judicial alternative. 
 
Transparency and effectiveness 
The more transparent a state’s policy making and financial management is, the easier it is to 
monitor the system’s capacity to manage conflict and identify and react to growing tension 
and possible usurping of power by the executive.  
 
Corruption can reduce the effectiveness with which a state can manage conflict. It can result 
in government ignoring the broader interests of society in peace-building and pursuing its 
own economic benefit. It can also lead to a reduction in its legitimacy in the eyes of 
citizens 31. There is, however, a need to understand the potential for corruption to ‘buy in’ and 
neutralise groups and individuals that might otherwise destabilise a state. 
 
                                                 
31 World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington, D.C, 2000, 
p.22. 
Rwanda 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The UN Security Council set up the ICTR in 1994 to prosecute individuals for crimes 
against humanity and genocide in 1994 in Rwanda and by Rwandans in neighbouring 
states.  It was decided it should be international to give it this wider jurisdiction and less 
bias.  Judges are elected by the UN General Assembly.  The maximum sentence it can 
impose is life imprisonment. 
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State incompetence will undermine a peace settlement, reduce a state’s legitimacy and 
increase the likelihood of citizens looking outside the democratic process to settle grievances. 
State legitimacy is enhanced where a state can demonstrate that it is capable of transparent 
financial management – taxation, and managing revenues and spending. This is particularly 
so where natural resources such as oil, diamonds or hardwoods bring in large amounts of 
revenue (see the final section for the need for international responses). In the short-term, the 
possibility could be explored of channelling revenues generated by natural resources through 
‘escrow’ accounts that allow for some international oversight of how the money is spent (as 
for the Chad/Cameroon oil pipeline proceeds)32. A state must also show results in delivering 
services and security to citizens; it must demonstrate that it can competently make and 
manage economic policy. For example, Malaysia’s economic performance is one of the key 
factors in the success of its consociational arrangements. Furthermore, there is a need for 
government policies that directly address the role of differential rates of economic 
advancement between communities and between regions in shaping their inter-ethnic 
hostilities33. 
 
There is a raft of possible institutions that can help generate this transparency: external audit 
commissions, effective budget offices, ombudsmen, independent broadcasting authorities, 
human rights commissions, anti-corruption commissions, commissions to consider land 
redistribution, and independent electoral commissions. Further work is needed to establish 
which of these should be prioritised. 
 
Inclusivity of the public sector 
It is crucial for employment in the public sector to be seen to be inclusive in a divided 
society. Affirmative action measures in the civil service, military and police recruitment can 
help to redress inter-group inequalities (with an awareness of the risk of a backlash from 
those groups who have previously been over-represented). One way of enticing members of 
rebel groups to accept state legitimacy is to offer them jobs in the public sector34. In the 
longer-term discrimination legislation can help to sustain this inclusivity.  
 
Democratic control of security forces 
The ability of the state to guarantee and monopolise security is a crucial element of 
legitimacy. Furthermore, long-term involvement of the military in politics severely depletes 
the capacity of civilian organisations to govern effectively post-transition (as has happened in 
Nigeria). Reform of the security sector is well covered elsewhere35, but it is worth noting here 
some of the governance initiatives that can help to keep the military in barracks36: 
 
Some attempt to draw a line under past human rights abuses with truth and justice reports 
(see above, p.12). 
Budgetary control of the military and weapons procurement policies. 
Parliamentary and media oversight of security and intelligence services. 
                                                 
32 P. Le Billon,  The Conflict, Security and Development Group Bulletin, Issue 11 (May-June 2001), Centre for 
Defence Studies, King’s College London. 
33 Stewart & O’Sullivan (1998). 
34 As happened under Museveni in Uganda 
35 DFID, Poverty and the Security Sector, Policy Statement, 1999; and DFID, Understanding and Supporting 
Security Sector Reform, forthcoming (2001c). 
36 L. Whitehead,  ‘Transitions from Military to Civilian Regimes’, paper given at DFID Governance Department 
Annual Development Seminar, Kendal, 4-5 October 2001. 
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National security councils and civilian Ministers of Defence. 
Control through domestic and international courts. 
Regional organisations which can apply pressure for democracy – Organisation of American 
States, SADC, West African States. 
Participation in international peace-keeping initiatives. 
 
 
International governance and conflict 
Conflicts which appear to be internal often have an international dimension: 
 
War economies are highly dependent on all forms of external support and trade networks. For 
example, UNITA’s contribution to the war in Angola during the latter part of the 1990s was 
largely underwritten by de Beers’ “no questions” diamond buying policy37. Furthermore, 
weapons are almost invariably imported. 
Collier found a correlation between the risk of conflict in a country and the size of its 
diaspora living in the United States of America (the assumption being that the larger the 
diaspora is, the greater the total remittances flowing back into the home country) 38.  
Neighbouring states or groups harboured within them often provide support to rebel groups. 
This is especially so when national frontiers do not correspond to boundaries between 
nationalities or ethnicities. 
International security interests, for example in Bosnia, have resulted in an emphasis on 
security in a region as opposed to longer-term democratic management of conflict. 
 
Civil conflict must therefore be understood within the broader global context. Kaldor and 
Luckham argue that globalisation has undermined nation states with the result that ethnic and 
cultural identities are threatened and consequently enhanced39. Some go further and argue 
that polarised wealth is a feature of the global economy and this unequal distribution of 
wealth is a source of structural violence. “What is lacking in the current reforms is the 
recognition that markets alone cannot redistribute wealth, enhance equality or improve 
human security”40. 
 
Conclusions: implications for donor intervention 
“Helping to strengthen the capacity of a society to manage tensions and disputes without 
resort to violence is a vital part of development work”41. 
 
International level action 
As Duffield argues42, the high level of dependence of war economies on international trade 
networks makes them vulnerable to concerted application of compliance and regulatory 
                                                 
37 Duffield (1999). 
38 P. Collier, Paper given to CODEP Annual Conference, SOAS, London, 2001. 
39 M. Kaldor & R. Luckham, ‘Global Transformations and New Conflicts’, in Structural Conflict in the New 
Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2001. 
40 S. Willet, ‘Introduction: Globalisation and Insecurity’ and ‘Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder’, 
in Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2, 
April 2001. 
41 OECD DAC, Guidelines on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris, 1997. 
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measures. International action is potentially very effective, and responds to the wave of 
opinion calling for more effort to be spent on creating the environmental conditions that 
encourage peaceful state-society relations and less “manipulat[ion] of state institutions of 
poor countries in the name of ‘good governance’”43. Options include: 
 
Sanctions. Aid sanctions can induce a political transition, as in Malawi in 1992-93, but have 
also failed, for example current sanctions in Iraq. 
Better regulation of commodities such as oil, diamonds, hardwoods, narcotics – through 
initiatives like the Kimberly Process, which involved negotiating an international certification 
scheme for rough diamond imports, or enhancing the transparency of oil payments. 
Voluntary codes of conduct to increase the transparency of international business practice – 
building on initiatives like BP’s offer to publicise all payments made to the Angolan 
government. 
Regulation of the flow of small arms through the Programme of Action emerging from the 
July 2001 UN conference on small arms, and through support to regional arms moratoria. 
Enhanced money laundering regulations and criminalisation of bribery committed abroad, 
combined with enhanced co-operation between intelligence services. 
Revision of development bank lending criteria to ensure that conditionality does not 
aggravate conflict. 
Support for regional organisations with a democratic clause in membership requirements. 
ECOWAS, for example, has taken an increasingly assertive role in conflict prevention and 
management.  For instance, it authorised the intervention of a West African peace-keeping 
force, ECOMOG, to restore the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone. 
 
National level action 
In an immensely complicated field, this section identifies some general principles and a menu 
of options for governance interventions in the field of conflict management. 
 
1. Some general principles: 
Careful analysis of the conflict risks is needed 
There are tools available that help to identify which countries are particularly at risk of 
violent conflict, for example the forthcoming DFID Conflict Assessment Guidelines. A 
simpler test proposed by Stewart is that countries are at risk when per capita incomes are very 
low, when they have recently suffered conflict and when there are severe inequalities 
between groups44. This includes a great number of countries and it perhaps indicates that 
development aid in all countries should be sensitive to how it interacts with conflict 
management. It is self-evident to say that intervention should be based on careful analysis of 
the country context45. Duffield argues that this requires development agencies, which are 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security, London: Zed 
Books, 2001. 
43 M. Moore, ‘New Institutional Theory, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction’, paper presented at the 
10th Anniversary Conference of the Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, London, 7-8 
September 2000. 
44 Stewart and FitzGerald (2001). 
45 For an analytical framework see L. Cliffe & R. Luckham, Complex Political Emergencies and the State: 
Failure and the Fate of the State, Third World Quartely, Vol 20, No 1 (1999), pp.27-50. 
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currently incapable of tackling such ‘complex’ problems, to change into radically different, 
adaptive, learning and networked organisations46. 
 
Timing is crucial 
Early intervention to pre-empt conflict from turning violent is crucial – as well as the obvious 
costs of war, once violent conflict has occurred, the risk of it re-emerging is very high47. The 
ending of violent conflict provides a rare opportunity for institutional change. Political and 
institutional choices that are made during periods of transition are crucial and can make all 
the difference between the consolidation of democracy and regression to non-democratic rule 
and conflict48. The risk is that divisions, which are particularly marked at that moment, 
become enshrined in new institutions. Where there is no opportunity for grand constitutional 
change, interventions should focus on conflict management through enhancing state 
legitimacy. But as Moore and Putzel have argued, it may be that no intervention is better than 
a badly informed one 49. 
 
Sustainable solutions need to be rooted in the national context 
The Dayton Accords for Bosnia-Herzegovina were not the result of a participatory process 
and internal actors now have no interest in legitimising them. That experience contrasts with 
the relative success of South Africa’s transformation driven by strong internal political 
processes. Strict democratic conditionality on aid can have the effect of undermining 
reformers. Furthermore, an over-reliance on international financing of peace institutions can 
cause problems when the financing ends as happened, for example, with the electoral system 
in Nicaragua 50.  
 
The conflict potential of radical democratisation and economic liberation must be 
appreciated 
The introduction of a narrow form of democracy based on a Western-style multi-party system 
has been identified as a major contributory factor to the political dynamics leading up to the 
genocide in Rwanda in 199451. In Cambodia during the reconstruction period in the mid-
1990s, rapid moves towards a market economy increased socio-economic insecurity for 
vulnerable groups, an emphasis on the rapid restoration of macroeconomic stability 
exacerbated political tensions; and civil service down-sizing undermined the post-war 
coalition52.  
 
Room for manoeuvre may be limited 
Complete freedom to design institutions is very improbable. Choices about institutions are 
never made rationally; they are influenced by power and interests. For example the 
international community’s interest might be in security (e.g. the Stability Pact in the Balkans) 
while national needs might be for longer-term conflict management structures. Even when 
rational choices have been made, there can be unintended consequences (as in Fiji – see box 
above). There are also strong arguments that it is better to make limited reforms of an 
existing system than to jump to a completely new and unfamiliar system. 
                                                 
46 Duffield (2001). 
47 Collier (2001). 
48 Luckham, et al. (2000). 
49 M. Moore & J. Putzel, Thinking Strategically about Politics and Poverty, Institute for Development Studies, 
Sussex University, Working Paper 101, 1999. 
50 Harris and Reilly (1998), p.357. 
51 D. Woodward, The IMF, the World Bank and Economic Policy in Rwanda: Economic, Social and Political 
Implications, Oxford: Oxfam, 1996. 
52 Hendrickson (2001). 
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Processes should be iterative 
One clear lesson from South Africa’s transition is the need for the institutional design process 
to be transparent and capable of evolving through successive iterations which can gradually 
reduce the importance of ethnic groups. 
 
2. Possible governance interventions to manage conflict peacefully 
Given all that has been said above, what governance interventions might improve a state’s 
capacity to manage conflict? 
 
Constitutional conflict management: 
Consider the possibilities of integrative power-sharing arrangements. If that is unrealistic, 
consider temporary consociational systems. 
Consider the possibilities for devolution of power, but consider the risks especially if it will 
occur along ethnic lines. 
Understand the power balance between the legislature and the executive and look at ways of 
increasing mutual checks without decreasing accountability and increasing the risk of 
deadlock. 
Consider how the electoral system interacts with the nature of the divided society and how 
changes to it might produce more moderate, inclusive behaviour. 
 
Improving conflict management through enhancing state legitimacy 
Intervene at the level of civil society to increase the role it plays in competitive politics (with 
sensitivity to the dangers of undermining state authority): support advocacy groups and 
embryonic political parties, strengthen the media to raise awareness of political rights, 
promote internal democracy and increase space for civil society participation in government 
processes. 
Work with political parties to develop programmes which are not identity based. 
Increase transparency and effectiveness in the public administration with improvements to 
public sector financial management; independent monitoring commissions; and a better 
understanding of the role corruption plays in both managing and generating conflict. This is 
particularly crucial in countries with large natural resource incomes. In such countries, 
explore the use of internationally monitored escrow accounts to manage natural resource 
revenues. 
Increase government capacity to produce policies aimed at reducing economic and social 
inequality – particularly inequality between groups.53 
Increase the opportunity costs of war by enhancing state capacity to deliver services. 
Strengthen the capacity and independence of the judiciary in order to increase government 
accountability and better manage existing tensions in society. 
Consider arrangements for delivering transitional justice: war crime tribunals, truth and 
reconciliation commissions and non-judicial systems. 
Increase the awareness of human rights and strengthen the institutions that protect them. 
                                                 
53 But see Collier (2001) where he argues that economic inequality might cause political protest, but does not 
increase the risk of conflict. 
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Enhance security through policing initiatives at the local level and improved democratic 
control over the security forces. 
Improve the inclusivity of the public sector through affirmative action and anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acronyms  
AV   Alternative Vote 
DFID   Department for International Development (UK) 
ECOWAS ` Economic Community of West African States 
ECOMOG  ECOWAS Monitoring Group (Peacekeeping Mission) 
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation 
OECD DAC Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development 
Assistance Committee 
PR   Proportional Representation 
SADC   Southern African Development Community 
STV   Single Transferable Vote 
TRC   Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
  
21
Bibliography 
Addison, T. (ed.), From Conflict to Reconstruction in Africa, Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, 2000 
Ayers, A. et al., Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts of Inequality, Poverty and 
Conflict, A Conceptual Framework , Draft Working Paper for DFID, October 1999 
Baaré A.; Shearer D.; and Uvin P., The limits and scope for the use of development assistance 
incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations. Case Study Rwanda, DAC, 
OECD, 1999. 
Bastian, S. and Luckham, R., ‘The Politics of Institutional Choice in Conflict-Torn Societies 
– Conclusions’, draft prepared for Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict-Torn 
Societies Conference, Sarajevo, September 2001 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna, ‘Managing Ethnic Conflicts: Democratic Decentralisation in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’, paper prepared for Strengthening Democratic Governance in Conflict-
Torn Societies Conference, Sarajevo, September 2001  
Berdal, M. and Malone, D.M. (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil 
Wars, Ottawa: IDRC, 2000 
Cliffe, L. and Luckham, R., Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the 
Fate of the State, Third World Quartely, Vol 20, No 1 (1999), pp.27-50 
Collier, P., Paper given to CODEP Annual Conference, SOAS, London, 2001 
Crook, R., 2001, Strengthening Democratic Governance In Conflict Torn Societies: Civic 
Organisations, Democratic Effectiveness And Political Conflict, Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies, 2001 
Diamond, L., ‘Towards Democratic Consolidation’, in Diamond, L and Plattner M.F. (eds.) 
The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996 
DFID, Poverty and the Security Sector, Policy Statement, 1999 
DFID, Making Government Work for Poor People: Building State Capacity, London, 2001a 
DFID, Conflict Prevention in the Balkans: A Strategy in the Area of Access to Justice, Draft, 
25 September, 2001b 
DFID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, forthcoming (2001c) 
Duffield, M., ‘Globalisation and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History’, 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, special issue on ‘The Geography of Confidence’, Vol 23, 
no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp.19-36 
Duffield, M., Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and 
Security, London: Zed Books, 2001 
Ero, C., ‘Africa’s Global Impact’ in Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: 
Insecurity and Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 2001) 
Frankel, J., Draft paper on Fiji prepared for Strengthening Democratic Governance in 
Conflict-Torn Societies Conference, Sarajevo, September 2001 
Harris, P. and Reilly, B., ‘Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators’, 
IDEA Handbook Series, Stockholm, 1998 
  
22
Hendrickson, D., ‘Globalisation, Insecurity and Post-war Reconstruction: Cambodia’s 
Precarious Transition’ in Structural Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and 
Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2 (April 2001) 
Horowitz, D. L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985 
Horowitz, D. L., A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided 
Society, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 
Horowitz, D. L., The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 
Huntingdon, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991 
Ignatieff, M., The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1998 
Kaldor, M. and Luckham, R., ‘Global Transformations and New Conflicts’, in Structural 
Conflict in the New Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 
2, April 2001 
Keen, D., ‘A Rational Kind of Madness’, Oxford Development Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (1997), 
pp. 67-75 
Le Billon, P., The Conflict, Security and Development Group Bulletin, Issue 11 (May-June 
2001), Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London 
Lemann, N., ‘What Terrorists Want’, The New Yorker, 29 October 2001, pp.36-41 
Lijphart, A., Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977 
Luckham, R.; Goetz, A.M. and Kaldor, M., Democratic Institutions and Politics in Contexts 
of Inequality, Poverty and Conflict: A Conceptual Framework , Institute of Development 
Studies, Sussex University, Working Paper 104, 2000 
Luckham, R.; Ahmed, I., Muggah, R. and White, S, Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: an Assessment of the Issues and Evidence, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex 
University, Working Paper 128, 2000 
McAllister, G., Power-Sharing and Post-Conflict Transition: A Comparative Study, paper 
prepared for DFID, May 2001 
McGarry, J. and O’Leary, B., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, London: Routledge, 
1997 
Moore, M. and Putzel, J., Thinking Strategically about Politics and Poverty, Institute for 
Development Studies, Sussex University, Working Paper 101, 1999 
Moore, M., ‘New Institutional Theory, Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction’, paper 
presented at the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Development Studies Institute, London 
School of Economics, London, 7-8 September 2000 
OECD DAC, Guidelines on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation, Paris, 1997 
Palmer, G. and Regan, P., Structural Impediments to Conflict Escalation: Political and 
Pivotal Parties in Parliamentary Democracies. 
Peck, C., Sustainable Peace: The Role of the United Nations and Regional Organisations in 
Preventing Conflict, Washington DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 
1998 
  
23
Przeworski, A., Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 
Pugh, M., and Cobble, M., ‘Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections: 
Implications for Democracy and Peace-Building’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, no. 1 
(2001), pp27-47 
Ray, J. L., ‘The Democratic Path to Peace’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 8, no. 2 (April 1997), 
pp49-64 
Reilly, B., and Reynolds, A., Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies, Committee 
on International Conflict Resolution, Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999 
Rummel, R.J., ‘Democracy, Power, Genocide and Mass Murder’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 39, no. 1 (1995), pp.3-26 
Sartori, G., The Theory of Democracy Revisited, New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987 
Sisk, T. D. and Reynolds, A. (eds.), Elections and Conflict Management in Africa, United 
States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C, 1998 
Smith, Zeric K., ‘The Impact of Political Liberalisation and Democratisation on Ethnic 
Conflict in Africa: An empirical test of common assumptions’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol. 38, no. 1 (2000), pp.29-39 
Stewart, F. and O’Sullivan, M., ‘Democracy, Conflict and Development – Three Cases’, 
QEH Working Paper Series 15, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 1998 
Stewart, F., ‘Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’, paper prepared for World 
Bank Conference on Eva luation and Poverty Reduction, July 14-15 , 1999 
Stewart, F. and FitzGerald V. (eds.), War and Underdevelopment, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001 
UNDP, Governance Foundations for Post-Conflict Situations: UNDP’s Experience, New 
York: MDGD, 2000 
Unsworth, S., ‘Understanding Pro-Poor Change: a discussion paper’, presented at DFID 
Governance Department Annual Development Seminar, Kendal, October 2001 
Uvin, P., Aiding Violence: the Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Connecticut: Kumarian 
Press, 1998 
Whitehead, L., ‘Transitions from Military to Civilian Regimes’, paper given at DFID 
Governance Department Annual Development Seminar, Kendal, 4-5 October 2001 
Willet, S., ‘Introduction: Globalisation and Insecurity’, in Structural Conflict in the New 
Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development, IDS Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 2, April 2001 
Willet, S., ‘Insecurity, Conflict and the New Global Disorder’, in Structural Conflict in the 
New Global Disorder: Insecurity and Development, IDS, 2001 
Woodward, D, The IMF, the World Bank and Economic Policy in Rwanda: Economic, Social 
and Political Implications, Oxford: Oxfam, 1996  
World Bank, Anticorruption in Transition: A Contribution to the Policy Debate, Washington, 
D.C, 2000 
 
 
  
24
Working Papers in Series (up to August 2003) 
 
WP1 Crisis States Programme, ‘Concept and Research Agenda’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP2 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research Activities’ (April 2001) 
WP3 Crisis States Programme, ‘States of Crisis in South Asia’ (April 2001) 
WP4 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research in Latin America’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP5 Crisis States Programme, ‘South Africa in Southern Africa’ (April 2001) 
WP6 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Making Danger a Calling: Anthropology, violence, and the dilemmas of participant 
observation’ (September 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP7 Hugh Roberts, ‘Co -opting Identity: The manipulation of Berberism, the frustration of democratisation 
and the generation of violence in Algeria’ (December 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP8 Shaibal Gupta, ‘Subaltern Resurgence: A reconnaissance of Panchayat election in Bihar’ (January 
2002) 
WP9 Benedict Latto, ‘Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for donor intervention’ (February 
2002) – Also available in Spanish  
WP10 Jo Beall, ‘The People Behind the Walls: Insecurity, identity and gated communities in Johannesburg’ 
(February 2002) – Also available in Spanish  
WP11 Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw & Susan Parnell, ‘Social Differentiation and Urban Governance in Greater 
Soweto: A case study of post-Apartheid reconstruction’ (February 2002) – Also available in Spanish 
WP12 E. A. Brett, ‘Liberal Theory, Uneven Development and Institutional Reform: Responding to the crisis 
in weak states’ (July 2002) 
WP13 John Harriss, ‘The States, Tradition and Conflict in North Eastern States of India’ (August 2002) 
WP14 David Keen, ‘Since I am a Dog, Beware my Fangs: Beyond a ‘rational violence’ framework in the 
Sierra Leonean war’ (August 2002) 
WP15 Joseph Hanlon, ‘Are Donors to Mozambique Promoting Corruption?’ (August 2002) 
WP16 Suzette Heald, ‘Domesticating Leviathan: Sungusungu groups in Tanzania’ (September 2002) 
WP17 Hugh Roberts, ‘Moral Economy or Moral Polity? The political anthropology of Algerian riots’ 
(October 2002) 
WP18 James Putzel, ‘Politics, the State and the Impulse for Social Protection: The implications of Karl 
Polanyi’s ideas for understanding development and crisis’ (October 2002) 
WP19 Hugh Roberts, ‘From Segmentarity to Opacity: on Gellner and Bourdieu, or why Algerian politics have 
eluded theoretical analysis and vice versa’ (December 2002) – Also available in French 
WP20 Jonathan DiJohn, ‘Mineral-Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A critical assessment 
of the rentier state model’ (December 2002) 
WP21 Victoria Brittain, ‘Women in War and Crisis Zones: One key to Africa’s wars of under-development’ 
(December 2002) 
WP22 Apurba Baruah, ‘Tribal Traditions and Crises of Governance in North East India, with special 
reference to Meghalaya’ (March 2003) 
WP23 Giovanni M. Carbone, ‘Emerging Pluralist Politics in Mozambique: the Frelimo -Renamo Party 
System’ (March 2003) 
WP24 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Fragmentación electoral y política tradicional en Colombia – piezas para 
un rompecabezas en muchas dimensiones’ (March 2003) – English version forthcoming 
WP25 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Los tiempos de las involuciones democráticas’ (March 2003) – English 
version forthcoming 
WP26 Manoj Srivastava, ‘The Dyamics of achieving ‘Power’ and ‘Reform’ as a Positive-Sum Game: A report 
on the preliminary ethnographic explorations of the politics-governance nexus in Madhya Pradesh, 
India’ (March 2003) 
WP27 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian 
experience’ (April 2003) 
WP28 Luis Eduardo Fajardo, ‘From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: A retrospective look at 
US aid to Colombia’ (April 2003) 
WP29 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Decentralisation and local government in Bolivia’ (May 2003) –Also available in 
Spanish 
WP30 Maria Emma Wills & Maria Teresa Pinto, ‘Peru’s failed search for political stability (June 2003) 
WP31 Robert Hunter Wade, ‘What strategies are viable for developing countries today?  The World Trade 
Organisation and the shrinking of ‘development space’ (June 2003) 
WP32 Carlos Medina & Hermes Martínez, ‘Violence and drug prohibition in Colombia’ (August 2003) 
 
 
  
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director: Dr James Putzel 
Administrator: Wendy Foulds 
Editorial Assistant: Jonathan Curry-Machado 
 
Development Research Centre,  
Development Studies Institute (DESTIN),  
LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631  Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6844 
e-mail: csp@lse.ac.uk 
www.crisisstates.com 
The aim of the Crisis States Programme (CSP) at DESTIN’s Development Research Centre is to 
provide new understanding of the causes of crisis and breakdown in the developing world and the 
processes of avoiding or overcoming them. We want to know why some political systems and 
communities, in what can be called the “fragile states” found in many of the poor and middle income 
countries, have broken down even to the point of violent conflict while others have not. Our work 
asks whether processes of globalisation have precipitated or helped to avoid crisis and social 
breakdown. 
Research Objectives 
 
 We will assess how constellations of power at local, national and global levels drive 
processes of institutional change, collapse and reconstruction and in doing so will challenge 
simplistic paradigms about the beneficial effects of economic and political liberalisation. 
 
 We will examine the effects of international interventions promoting democratic reform, 
human rights and market competition on the ‘conflict management capacity’ and production and 
distributional systems of existing polities.  
 
 We will analyse how communities have responded to crisis, and the incentives and moral 
frameworks that have led either toward violent or non-violent outcomes.  
 
 We will examine what kinds of formal and informal institutional arrangements poor 
communities have constructed to deal with economic survival and local order. 
Crisis States Programme collaborators
 
In India:
Asia Development Research Institute (Patna, Bihar)
NEIDS, North-East Hill University (Shillong)
In South Africa:
Wits Institute of Social & Economic Research (WISER)
Sociology of Work Workshop (SWOP)
Department of Sociology
(University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg)
In Colombia:
IEPRI, Universidad  Nacional de Colombia
Universidad de los Andes 
Universidad del Rosario 
